



An asymmetric world—marked by gross imbalances of power and
unconventional tactics—requires that we regularly reexamine federal
judicial power and its limits. Now, more than ever, the jurisdiction and
justiciability doctrines cannot remain static. Since 9/11, the judiciary's
coequal branches of government have flexed significant political muscle
in waging the global "war on terror." These congressional and executive
actions have direct and indirect consequences on the rule of law and on
constitutional rights. Such consequences place special importance on the
Supreme Court's essential function of safeguarding constitutional protec-
tions.
This Article accepts the invitation to think boldly—to get radical
about our judicial vision. We began a dialogue on Alternative Judicial
Visions as part of a panel held at the Southeastern Association of Law
Schools conference in July 2008. My  remarks center on the need for the
federal judiciary to exercise a  strong voice when another branch
has upset the balance of  powers. President George W. Bush's broad
interpretation of executive authority in the execution of the global war on
terror, often supported by Congress, required that the Court act more
aggressively to keep the other branches in check. One consequence of
9/11 is  the new reality of  ever-present asymmetric warfare. A  more
dynamic judic ial theory is  necessary, and a  rethinking o f  restraint
doctrines is imperative. This  Article focuses on the application of one
justiciability doctrine—the political question doctrine—because of  its
unique relevance in times of great separation-of-powers tension.
Associate Dean o f  Faculty Research &  Development and Professor of  Law, West Virginia
University. A  sincere thank you to co-panelists Michael P. Allen, Andrew Siegel, and Stephen
Viadeck, for  the ongoing dialogue on federal courts and alternative judicial visions and for  their
helpful suggestions regarding this Article. Special thanks to Andrew M. Wright for  thoughtful
comments. I  also remain indebted to Allen Mendenhall and Matthew L. Clark for research assis-
tance and to Bertha Romine for editing support.
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"Asymmetric world" has more than one meaning. T h e  global
reality demonstrates the gross imbalances of power and the increased use
of unconventional tactics. Those who exercise power include nontradi-
tional actors, such as alleged terrorists, who operate beyond nation-state
borders. O n  a domestic level, another asymmetry exists—the external
pressures o f  terrorism caused a heightened response by the political
branches in the United States. Thus, the federal judiciary confronts a
domestic balance of powers that is asymmetrical. The judicial branch
must be dynamic: i t  must be aware of  its surroundings and adapt its
doctrines. I n  asymmetrical times, the political branches need expanded
powers, but this reality carries the threat of overreaching. The Court will
need to demonstrate that it will check the political branches as part of its
separation-of-powers duty. Accordingly, the Court will need to consider
more carefully when to assume jurisdiction, when to exercise judicial
review, and when to speak boldly.
The world's asymmetric reality, including threats to the rule of law
and constitutional protections, dictates reviewing doctrines of  judicial
restraint. The reexamination should cover popular approaches as well as
judicially created restraints, including judicial minimalism, hostility to
litigation, and the prudential justiciability doctrines. These doctrines of
restraint seek to serve laudable purposes, including respecting other
branches' spheres o f  legitimate control and preserving scarce judicial
resources. Such doctrines foster an environment in which the Supreme
Court hears fewer cases and often limits the substantive reach of those
cases.' This Article assumes that the Court will maintain or continue to
shrink its docket.
With mandatory appellate jurisdiction almost gone, the Supreme
Court exercises enormous discretion when granting certiorari; the Court
grants only 3-4% of petitions each year. I n  the current era, it is safe to
assume that the Court will likely decide only seventy cases per year.
2 I nthe 2007 term from October 2 to June 28, for example, the Court decided
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1. Procedural reforms are not the crux of  this Article but remain important. Such reforms
include increasing the Supreme Court's docket and enhancing the types of cases selected for review.
Professor Amanda Frost addressed these issues at the SEALS Conference Alternative Judicial
Visions Panel in Palm Beach, Florida (July 2008).
2. For statistical analyses o f  federal court dockets, see Judicial Business o f  the United
States Courts 2007, available at http://www.uscourts.govijudbus2007/contents.html. Regarding the
Supreme Court, see id at Table A-I Cases on Docket, Disposed of, and Remaining on Docket, 2002
through 2006.
3. Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, July
I, 2007, at Al .
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current decade, "the Supreme Court reviews only one in one hundred
appellate decisions."
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vigilant reexamination of the purposes and means of jurisdictional limits
is necessary t o  ensure safeguarding o f  constitutional protections.
Particular scrutiny should flow when the tensions touch on the heart of
the American constitutional democracy—the separation of powers.
The new reality suggests that the other branches o f  American
government will exercise their authority in bold and unanticipated ways
at home and abroad. Many  such actions will involve interpretations of
constitutional authority and may impinge on individual constitutional
rights. The unforeseen method of attack on 9/11 caused inflated interna-
tional and domestic responses to re-secure our national security. The
terrorist attacks exposed our vulnerabilities and served as a catalyst for
much-needed security repair. I n  hindsight, some actions will be viewed
as reacting too broadly at the expense o f  constitutional freedoms.
Tensions between the individual vis-à-vis the government will continue
to be under stress.
Other tensions are also on the rise. The current economic crisis has
triggered a greatly expanded federal role. T he federal government is
increasingly involved in managing the economy. This expanded federal
involvement will add stress on the freedom to contract, federalism, pre-
emption doctrine, and separation of powers. For  example, iterations of














































industry and beyond. A s  the federal political branches become more
entrenched, the parameters of  the federal judiciary's role will require
attention.
In addition, the militarization of, .and Presidential involvement in,
terrorism cases brings acute tension on the separation o f  powers.
Accordingly, the new asymmetric reality will call for greater federal
court involvement. Further, the asymmetric reality has no end in sight.
The federal judiciary will need to help by checking the other branches to
facilitate a political course of correction. The political branches, legisla-
tive and executive, will continue to choose and manage the course of
national security, but the Court must answer the call when constitutional
4. PETER M .  SHANE &  HAROLD H.  BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW—CASES AND
MATERIALS 32 (2d ed. 2005).
5. See, e.g., Rod Smolla, Wall Street Strip—Is Paulson's Bailout Bill Unconstitutional, SLATE,
Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.slate.comild/2200817/ (quoting the jurisdiction-stripping provision from
Section 8 of Paulson's proposal: "Decisions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act are
non-reviewable and committed to agency discretion, and may not be reviewed by any court of law or
any administrative agency."); Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008
(providing the full text of Paulson's bailout proposal).
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bounds are violated. This  heightened context will no doubt require the
Court to enter the fray to protect constitutional rights as they are tested in
new and unforeseen ways. The federal judiciary must be careful not to
overstep its power. Yet, the consequences of a failure to act, a decision
lacking clarity, or minimalist, piecemeal responses may be dire.
To what extent, i f  any, should the Court adjust to this reality?
Chief Justice John Roberts's confirmation hearings included advocacy
for unanimity, collegiality, and a judge-as-umpire mode1.
6 S i n c e  c o n fi r -mation, Chi f Justice Roberts has influenced the Court's reluctance to
hear certain cases and its overt restraint as a driving influence in decision
making. Related consequences include a shrinking docket and a shift in
the nature of cases from constitutional rights to business matters. Forces
of restraint, such as judicial minimalism and avoidance doctrines, stem
from a respectable concern regarding the temptation to abuse power.
Such doctrines o f  restraint may embody wise impulses, but these
doctrines should not constitute governing jurisprudence for all cases.
The Supreme Court should reconsider its prudential justiciability
doctrines and their underlying assumptions. For  example, consider the
conventional wisdom regarding the justiciability doctrines: " [T he
justiciability doctrines conserve judicial resources, allowing the federal
courts to focus their attention on the matters most deserving of review."'
What if  the federal courts are not using justiciability doctrines to focus
on matters most deserving of review but instead are using justiciability
doctrines as shields to dismiss thorny matters and avoid confrontation?
The Supreme Court, in particular, may be shifting its interests towards
business cases rather than individual constitutional rights. To the extent
the Court is tempted to use the justiciability doctrines to defer to the
political branches, is such avoidance riskier in the modem asymmetric
climate? The increased risk stems from the temptation of the political
branches to overstep their authority and from the severe consequences of
such overreaches i f  left unchecked. Alternatively, the Court may hear
the case but rule in a minimalist fashion and, rather than address the
primary merits, signal to another branch that it should act. This  Article
will address the potential dangers of judicial minimalism as a governing
jurisprudence in these times.
As a global theory, this Article offers a judicial dynamism model.
It then articulates the relevance of the political question doctrine and the
need to view the doctrine as prudential rather than constitutional. Once
viewed as prudential, the political question doctrine should remain
6. See generally Michael P. Allen, A Limited Defense of (at least some of) the Umpire Analogy,
32 SEK1TLE U. L. REV. 525 (2009).
7. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 45 (5th ed. 2007).
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flexible; the contours o f  any given separation-of-powers alignment
should tilt the jurisdictional scales. For example, I present an alignment
hypothesis: i f  the President and Congress have aligned to support a
federal action that implicates constitutional rights, the jurisdictional
scales should tilt in favor of judicial review on the merits. This Article
concludes that such a reframing will allow the Court to have a dynamic
voice when it matters most.
First, I  discuss the Supreme Court's increased use o f  judicial
minimalism and the political question doctrine to avoid important cases
and reduce its docket. Second, I describe my model, in which the court
takes a dynamic approach to such issues, dependent upon the political
climate, to  maintain its  appropriate stature and the Constitution's
intended balance of powers. I  use two recent cases to illustrate my pre-
scription and how it  is  particularly relevant to the ongoing war on
terror. Third, I examine the long-standing political question doctrine and
show how dynamism would clarify that it is a prudential, not constitu-
tional, limitation. Finally , I endorse a dynamic court, which takes up
important constitutional questions when the balance of powers warrant
that the federal judiciary assume its jurisdiction and speak boldly.
OF MINIMALISM, SHRINKING DOCKET, AND CHANGING COURSE
A confluence of influences has resulted in the Supreme Court doing
less rather than more. This  phenomenon exists on both the procedural
and substantive planes. B y  constitutional design, the federal judiciary
has a limited role. The courts have a passive posture by definition—they
may only hear "cases" and "controversies" properly presented as circum-
scribed by Article III of the Constitution. Within the limited jurisdiction
provided, the Supreme Court, final judicial arbiter in the United States,
has limited reach. I n  fact, "[Ole Supreme Court, at the apex o f  a
constantly growing pyramid of lower federal courts that finally decide























































fewer and fewer cases. And the class of cases is shifting away from fun-
damental rights to the Supreme Court's "fast-growing business docket."
9Should we be concerned? Even i f  we grant that hearing fewer cases
ensures higher quality (certainly not always the case), we should pause to
question the pervasiveness and influence of judicial minimalism, of the
Court's open hostility to litigation,
m a n d  o f  
t h e  s h i f t  
i n  
c l a s s e s  
o f  
c a s e
s
8. SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 4, at 23.
9. Greenhouse, supra note 1
HI See, e.g., Dura Pharrns., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (chiding abusive
litigation practices and "routine filing of lawsuits" and tightening the pleading standards for private
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for which the Court grants certiorari. I n  this Part, I will first address the
meaning and importance of the doctrine of judicial minimalism. Then, I
will show the dangers of the Court's overuse of judicial minimalism. Fo r
example, rigid adherence to minimalist principles may cause the Court to
cripple itse lf  and facilitate a  power grab by the political branches o f
government.
Many current commentators praise methods o f  restraint, such as
minimalism, and their consequences; however, we must first be clear
on the contours and roots o f  judicial minimalism. Wh i le  judicial min i-
malism stems from the conservative tradition o f  Burkean minimalism,"
modern advocates also include progressives.
I2 T h e  a p p r o a c h  
o f  
j u d i c i a l
minimalism in  its simplest form—resolve cases one step at a  t ime—
sounds unobjectionable, especially i f  one appreciates the status quo,
certainty, and predictability. Professor Benjamin Zipursky describes the
motivations of the doctrine:
What minimalism principally involves as an affirmative matter is a
story about the virtues o f  incrementalism, the risks o f  any fu ll
throttle pursuit of a judicial agenda, the values of stare decisis, and
the value o f  giving time and space to difficult social problems so
that other institutional forces better suited to  producing broad
answers can develop some approach over t ime.
13
federal securities fraud actions by requiring the plaintiff to prove loss and causation because without
such requirements "a plaintiff 'with a largely groundless claim [could] simply take up the time of a
number of  other people, with the r ight to do so representing an in terrorem increment i n the
settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal
relevant evidence.") (citation omitted) (second bracket in original).
11. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006) ("Burkean
minimalists believe that constitutional principles must be built incrementally and by analogy, with
close reference to long-standing practices."). I n this article, one of Professor Sunstein's goals is to
show "that Burkean minimalism is a plausible response to limited information and bounded rational-
ity on the part of the federal judiciary." Id. at 356 nol 1. Professor Sunstein offers this argument in
response to Judge Posner's skepticism o f  the adoption o f  Burkean minimalism to judicial
philosophy. Judge Posner previously argued:
[Y]ou cannot just admire Burke and think you have found a judicial philosophy.
Prudentialism is the repeated sounding of a note of caution (repeated, not consistent—a
consistently cautious person would be cautious about caution as well as about everything
else), and a tune with one note soon becomes tedious.
RI CHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 4 4 4
-
4 5  ( 1 9 9 0 ) .
12. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES—WHY EXTREME R I G H T
-
W I N G  C O U R T S
ARE W RO NG  F O R A M E RI CA  ( 2005) ;  CA S S  R .  SUNST EI N,  O N E  CA S E  A T  A  T I M E
-
J U D I C I A L
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). C f  Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism:
Rethinking the Balance between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753
(2004) (arguing for  principled minimalism that would balance minimalist traditions with Herbert
Wechsler's neutral principles doctrine).
13. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Minimalism, Perfectionism, and the Common Law Constitutional-
ism: Reflections on Sunstein's and Fleming's Efforts to Find the Sweet Spot in Constitutional The-
ory, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2997, 3000-01 (2007).
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Accordingly, the justifications for judicial minimalism include attractive
judicial goals such as respecting precedent and recognizing the inherent
limits on the judiciary's ability to cure societal ills.
Yet, a minimalist approach is not without consequence. A s  Profes-
sor Zipursky points out, "there is a  kind o f  risk aversion built  into
minimalism that, in  other areas o f  life and law, is  regarded as non-
optimal because, while it removes certain large negatives, it also removes
certain large posit ives."
14  O n  
b a l a n c e ,  
t h e  
f e d e r
a l  
j u d i c
i a r y  
m a
y
determine that the risk is worth the benefits of restraint, especially given
that the political branches are best suited to accomplish large positives.
But, what i f  the Court confronts large negatives as a result o f  collective
political branch action that threatens constitutional rights? Th e  Court
may need to brandish the power of potential judicial review not cabined
with strict, minimalism boundaries.
There is a distinction between the Court having freedom to act in
non-minimalist ways and actually acting in a non-minimalist fashion. To
be clear, this Article is not advocating that the Court always, or even
often, act boldly. I  am positing that the Court needs the flexib ility to
address grave imbalances of power. The political branches must believe
that the federal judiciary serves as a bona fide check on their political
power. I t  is critical that doctrines o f restraint, such as political question
and judicial minimalism, do not hamstring the Court's ability to appear,
and when necessary actually serve, as a check.
When the Court serves as an actual check, its judicial review may
result in  the significant determination that the wi l l  o f  the people, as
implemented by Congress, is unconstitutional. Striking legislation is not
an act the Court does, or should, take lightly. Judicial minimalism may
aid in  avoiding such counter-majoritarian rulings—invalidating legisla-
tion and executive action resulting from the democratic process.
I5 T h econcern stems f ro m the reality that members o f  the Court, un like
members o f  Congress and the President, are appointed rather than
politically elected, and thus the Court thwarts the will of the people when
it strikes legislation.
I6 J u d i c i a l  
m i n i m a
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and do no more than necessary. Accordingly, judicial minimalism is not
the antidote for preventing counter-majoritarian rulings.
14. Id. at 3003.
15. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962) (discussing the
"Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty").
16. Id.
7. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 12, at x.
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Minimalism may be desirable on the simple basis that any govern-
mental body should act with restraint in exercising its power. Given ju-
dicial minimalism's restraint focus, it also includes or harmonizes with
other doctrines of judicial avoidance such as abstention and political
question. Consider, however, the following troubling logic:
[B]ecause Burkean minimalists tend to value the passive virtues,
eschew po lit ica l questions, a n d  emphasize t h e  A rt ic le  I I I
requirements of actual cases and controversies—standing, ripeness,
and injury—perhaps neither the declining size of the Supreme
Court's docket nor the Court's increased attention to business mat-
ters, should cause concern or catch us by surprise.
18Although we may not be surprised, we should be concerned. T h e
Supreme Court represents a limited, special resource for judicial review.
I f  the Court opts to  allocate its limited t ime and significant force to
business disputes in lieu of other matters, we should at least pause to
examine if the Court has abdicated an important component of its role in
our constitutional democracy. A t  a minimum, we should move forward
with our eyes open to the consequences.
Jurisprudentially, judicial minimalism may pose a dangerous and
false cabining effect on jurists. Min ima lism places them into a box; one
wall is formed by the jurist's perception that she is unable to reach an
optimal and logical result because judicial minimalism begins to appear
as a "marching order" rather than a guiding principle.
° I n s i d e  t h e  b o x ,jurists are encouraged to clothe their opini n in the language o f minimal-
ism or show signals o f  conformity through limited action. I n  the ideal
model, the jurists would act in good faith and operate in compliance with
minimalism to justify its ruling and to fend off critics. The temptation
from another wall o f  the box is to feign restraint, and an opposing wall
tempts a jurist to accuse the competing opinion with failing to adhere or
feigning.
In the plurality decision in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Founda-
tion, Inc.,"  the Court acted in a limited (and flawed) fashion under the
bounds of an apparent minimalist jurisprudence. T h e Heth plaintiffs
maintained that the Executive's expenditures for faith-based programs
and conferences that included religious imagery, fo r example, violated
18. Henry Scott, Note, Burkean Minimalism and the Roberts Court's Docket, 6 GEO. i L.  &
PUB. POL'Y 753, 759-60 (2008).
19. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (lamenting that the Court's three-guideposts test for  punitive damages has begun to
resemble "marching orders").
20. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
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the First Amendment's Establishment Clause?' T he  Court addressed
whether plaintiffs satisfied Article II I  standing requirements based on
paying federal taxes.
22 
T r a d i t i o n a
l l y ,  
g e n e r a
l i z e d  
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challenges brought by virtue of taxpaying status, do not satisfy standing
requirements.
23 T h e  
p l a i n t





















ments pursuant to  the Court's Pas t  v . Cohen taxpayer standing
exceptio .
24 
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because they did not fit into the narrow Mast exception?' O n a strict
reading, the Court reasoned that Hein was distinguishable from Past
because Flast's purported Establishment Clause violation "was funded
by a specific congressional appropriation and was undertaken pursuant to
an express congressional mandate" and because these facts established
the requisite "logical link between [their taxpayer] status and the type of
legislative enactment attacked."
26 I n  
c o n t r a s t ,  
t h e  
H e i n  
e x p e n d i t
u r e s ,
accordi g to the plurality, "were not made pursuant to any Act o f
Congress[;] [r]ather, Congress provided general appropriations to the
Executive Branch to fund its day-to-day activities."
27 T h u s ,  u n l i k e  
M a s t ,
"Congress did not specifically authorize the use of federal funds to pay
for the conferences" challenged in Hein, but rather, such events "were
paid for out of general Executive Branch appropriations."
28 I t  w a s  u p o nhis distinction that the Hein plurality resolved that the plaintiffs lacked
standin . Notably, the Court declined the opportunity to overrule Flast.
29Instead, Justice Alito's plurality opinion declined to "expand[] t h e





24.392 U.S. 83 (1968). In Past, the Court permitted a narrow exception to the general prohi-
bition against federal taxpayer standing. I d  at 102-03. The Court found the standing requirements
were met by  the taxpayer-plaintiff who challenged a  law that distributed federal funds to
religious schools in an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. I n  addition to Article III's
traditional standing requirements, the Ras'  Court ruled that to qualify for  a taxpayer standing
exception, "the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative
enactment attacked" and "the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise
nature of  the constitutional infringement alleged." I d  T he Flast Court held that the plaintiffs
satisfied both of these prongs and thus possessed standing to sue in federal court, claiming that the
Establishment Clause posed a limit on Congress's taxing and spending power and that Congress's
legislation funding religious schools violated the Establishment Clause. Id.
25. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559.
26. Id at 2565-66 (brackets in original).
27. M at 2566.
28. Id. at 2559.
29. Id at 2571-72.
30. M at 2571.
31. M at 2572.
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He further emphasized, "We decide only the case at hand."
32 B u t  a .bolder and more logical decision in favor of expanding taxpayer standing
or overruling Rases taxpayer standing exception
33 w o u l d  h a v e  
b e e n  a
judicially wiser result_
34 •Justice Scalia 's dissenting opinion i n  He in  demonstrates how
confounded he is with  the plurality's solution and his disdain fo r the
guise of minimalism as, ostensibly, the leading principle:
Why, then, pick a distinguishing fact that may breathe life into Flast
in future cases, preserving the disreputable disarray o f  our
Establishment Clause standing jurisprudence? Wh y  not hold that
only taxpayers ra ising  Establishment Clause challenges t o
expenditures pursuant to the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 have standing? That, I  suppose, would be too obvious
a repudiation o f  Flast, and thus an impediment to the plurality's
pose of minimalism. A n y  last pretense of minimalism—of adher-
ing to prior law but merely declining to "extend" it—is swept away
by the fact that the Court's holding flatly contradicts Kendrick.
35The po in t  i s  tha t jud icia l min ima lism i s  fin e  a s  simp ly another
jurisprudence that blends in the background for a judge to follow. Th e
deeper adoption, especially by Supreme Court Justices, however, may
create an unhelpful limitation in  some cases as we ll as a  trap where
jurists waste energy discussing the level o f true and feigned adherence to
the doctrine rather than focusing on the merits. Jud icia l minimalism,
even acknowledging some o f  its beneficial attributes, should not be a
marching order for the federal judiciary. A n y focus on the Court's capti-
vation with minimalism is distracting i f  it clouds the judgment of jurists
as they attempt to reach, and optimally resolve, the substantive merits for
the instant and future cases. L i k e  any useful doctrine, i f  taken to an
extreme, it loses its salience:
Minimalism is an admirable judicial trait, but not when it comes at
the cost of meaningless and disingenuous distinctions that hold the
sure promise of engendering further meaningless and disingenuous
distinctions in the future. The  rule o f law is ill served by forcing
lawyers and judges to make arrments that deaden the soul o f thelaw, which is logic and reason?
32.1d
33. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
34. But see Brendan R. McNamara, Note,. Forceful Minimalism, Hein V. Freedom from
Religion Foundation, Inc., and the Prudence of 'Not Doing,' 83 WASH. L. REV. 287, 306-07 (2008)
(maintaining that the Hein opinion demonstrates the success of judicial minimalism in practice).
35. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2580 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 2582 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The d ifficu lt,  ye t  necessary, discussion involves the question,
"when is restraint appropriate?" The discussion must recognize that the
context matters. Further, the doctrine o f  minimalism wil l  not provide
the right answer in every given conflict. Professor Neil Siegel wisely
maintains that restraint is appropriate at some, but not all, times. F o r
example, he suggests that restraint may be advisable "when legislatures
are expressing social ideals in ways that do not conflict with fundamental
constitutional values" and "when the social problem at hand is difficult
to address effectively and the consequences o f  judicial intervention
are highly uncertain."
37 H e  
a l s o  
e m p h a s i
z e s  
t h e  
d a n






i c i a
r y
disrupting the delicate balance o f  powers in a time o f strife and calls for
"the path of statesmanship." Accordingly, he contends that
conflict avoidance, at least for the time being, may be the path o f
statesmanship, as when the country is bitterly divided and legal
intervention at that moment might increase balkanization and thwart
vindication of the very values that would justify the intervention.
38Yet, the prudential restraint o f a diplomat will not always be the proper
path for the federal judiciary. I n  fact, the appropriate role for the Court
may require facing conflict. Acco rd ing  to Professor Siegel, in  these
moments,
judges can best accomplish the preconditions and purposes o f  law
for which judicial statesmanship is responsible by intervening in the
right sort of way: by acknowledging conflict, not avoiding it. The
situation may require decisive action in the wake of such acknowl-
edgment, or it may require efforts to ameliorate conflict—or at least
to keep it to a manageable level—through crafting law that to some
extent reflects the values of each side.
39Our analyses must incorporate and extend this debate to determine the
appropriate uses, and limits, o f  judicial minimalism. Certa in moments,
especially in  asymmetric times, wi l l  dictate that the federal judiciary
confront conflict, conduct judicial review, and, where necessary, correct
the course of our constitutional democracy.
Judicial minimalism, with  its sister doctrine o f  avoidance, is not
the panacea. T h e  benefits include predictability, certainty, respect for
coordinate branches, and gradual change. Min ima lism seeks to ensure
that the political branches, rather than the courts, are seen as the path to
large change. Such goals are laudable and may be worth setting one's
judicial sights on much of the time. B u t  we should not follow the path
37. Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue oPudicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 993 (2008).
38. Id
39. Id
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without question. These doctrines of restraint as a global approach limit
the Court's ability  to handle the myriad o f  unforeseen issues that
may arise. Simply put, certain controversies warrant the Supreme Court
confronting the conflict and speaking clearly and, perhaps, more than
incrementally.
A JUDICIAL DYNAMISM MODEL FOR AN ASYMMETRIC WORLD
The overarching model for the Court should be dynamic. T he
Court must have the flexibility to adapt to changing times such that it
may ideally manage its docket and optimally resolve the merits of cases
that are most worthy of resolution. A  fundamental tenet of our judicial
system is that like cases should be treated alike. To be clear, I am not
disagreeing with this central tenet to justice. Following the call of fair-
ness and equality, however, does not command that all classes of cases
be treated the same or that one jurisprudence govern all matters. The
Supreme Court's three levels of scrutiny acknowledge this reality.
Scholars critique inconsistent application of judicial philosophy, but
in truth we only seek consistent application of doctrines that we advocate
for or that we believe lead to just results. Thus, I have no problem with
Justice Clarence Thomas's inconsistent application o f  originalism
principles to affirmative action cases.
4° C o n s i s t e n c y  
o f  
j u d i c i a l  
p h i l o s o -
phy matters (i) across like cases and (ii) to the extent that a jurist claims
superiority in reasoning based upon claimed adherence to a chosen
doctrine. F o r  my purposes here, the reader need only agree with the
noncontroversial principle that certain classes o f  cases may require
unique treatment.
Jurisprudential consistency may not be a primary goal for justices
under a particular confluence of features. A  jurist may need an ebb and
flow to her jurisprudence depending upon the nature of rights at stake
and the context of the decision making. The judge will always have
some institutional bounds, including both norms and the deterrence
of public opinion. Jurists must also consider the effects on the overall
narrative of the Court as a continuing body that legitimizes the rule of
40. A SEALS panel entitled The Jurisprudence of  Justice Clarence Thomas explored Justice
Thomas's application of "original intent" doctrine across cases (Palm Beach, July 27, 2008). Panel-
ists included Professors Thomas Crocker, William Araiza, Scott Gerber, Eboni Nelson, and Neil
Siegel.
41. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-32 (1986) (analogizing judges to chain novelists
who create one unified novel through caselaw); see also Siegel, supra note 37, at 1032 ("But
because law is an institution that must account for the conditions of its own legitimation and because
expressing social values and sustaining social solidarity are basic purposes of law, the practice of
judicial statesmanship must define a virtue in the role of a judge.").
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A judicial dynamism model is workable as an overarching theory
because it fosters tailoring to the issues and to the times. The danger of
abuse of  power remains in light of  the inherent flexibility o f  such a
mode1.
42 I  














































The system will not work perfectly, but it  will foster less posturing
regarding faithful adherence to a chosen judicial philosophy and greater
reasoned elaboration on the merits.
43 F u r t h e r ,  
t h e  
t i m e s  
w a r r a n t  
i t .
The post-9/1 1 world presents an altered landscape that is asymmet-
rical. Pr viously, it  was widely viewed that there were two states of
security for a nation: war or peace. This  outlook constituted a binary
view of  the prevailing security environment. Now,  the Court has to
articulate its posture in an era where there is not a clearly defined status
of war and peace. War  no longer has a clear end. The United States is
involved in a global war on terror without a finite timeline or an easily
defined enemy. Thus, the threats and responses are asymmetrical. The
binary view is no longer applicable, yet the binary view continues to in-
form judicial decisions, which tilt toward viewing the Executive from a
wartime footing.
Earlier in American history, it was possible for the Court to wait for
the dispute to subside so as not to interfere with the Executive's ability to
wage war. For example, President Lincoln overreached during the Civil
War, but the time lag allowed the Court to avoid acting in the middle
of the national crisis. Now, in a non-binary existence, we have a new
context where the administration is waging a new kind of war: one that is
nonstop, in multiple countries, and against terrorist groups rather than
nation-states. We  have no peace treaty with Al Qaeda. I n  the binary
view, peace and war are declared. This  model does not apply to the
current climate. For example, the Defense Department is implementing a
new theory of war, "Phase Zero," which is not used to govern conflict
but instead to "shape" environments so as to prevent conflict.
44 S u c h
42. Of course, "[a]nything taken to an extreme c a n  corrupt." Siegel, supra note 37, at 991
(admitting this truth for his theory of judicial statesmanship).
43. Joel Feinberg, Law from the Perspective of the Judge—The Dilemmas of Judges Who Must
Interpret "Immoral Laws," in JOEL FEINBERG & JULES COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 118 (6th
ed. 2000) (describing as one of a judge's choices when faced with an immoral law: "he may cheat,
[and] state that the law is not what he believes it to be, and thus preserve an appearance (to others) of
the conformity to law and morality").
44. See Charles F. Wald, New Thinking at USEUCOM—The Phase Zero Campaign, 43 JR?
72-75 (2006), available at h t
-
t p : / /
w w w • n d u . e d u /
i n s s i p r e s s i j f q _ p
a g e s i e d i t i o n s i i 4
3 / 2 0 % 2 0 . 1 F Q 4 3 %
2 0
Wald.pdf (describing the "deliberate strategy of engagement," known as Phase Zero, as the "new
thinking and new understanding" with a "theater security cooperation" that involves "fighting the
war on terror using a new approach, focusing on terrorism's longterm, underlying conditions [that]
in truth it is much more than just a new phase of systematic campaign planning; it is a new form of
campaign in and of itself"); see also U.S. Spectrum of Operations PowerPoint, The Web of Military
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creative programs will raise new questions o f  constitutionality. T he
Executive has the authority to exercise heightened power during wartime
but should not backdoor fundamental, permanent changes in the power
balance among the branches. The Court will have to analyze the bounds
of such powers and will likely be unable to wait for a definite end to the
conflict. These tough questions exist under the current unitary executive
theory and may morph into other positions under the new administration
as it determines how to wage the global war on terror. The Court has to
articulate a phase type of approach or the Executive benefits from an "at
war" approach." The justiciability doctrines must evolve.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion i n  Boumediene v . Bush
acknowledges the uniqueness of the terrain:
Because our Nation's past military conflicts have been o f  limited
duration, it  has been possible to leave the outer boundaries o f the
war powers undefined. I f ,  as some fear, terrorism continues to pose
dangerous threats for us for the years to come, the Court might not
have this luxury_46
He further warns that the branches can avoid a separation-of-powers
collision i f  "Nile political branches consistent with their independent
obligations to interpret and uphold the Constitution, can engage in a
genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional values while
protecting the Nation from terrorism."
47 T h e  t e r r o r i s m  
c o n t e x t ,  
w h i c h
Justice Scalia's dissent echoes as a parade of horribles," combines with
rapidly changing technologies to  fo rm reason enough to  revisit the
doctrines o f  justiciability—including abstention and political question.
These and other doctrines of self-restraint cannot remain static.
Operations (quoting General Peter J. Schoomaker, CSA: "War is both a physical reality and a state
of mind. W ar  is ambiguous, uncertain, and unfair. When we are at war, we must think and act
differently. W e become more flexible and more adaptable. W e must anticipate the ultimate reality
check—combat.") (PowerPoint on file with author).
45. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring).
46. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008). I n  Boumediene, the Court addressed
the Military Commission Act of 2006, which stripped federal court jurisdiction over habeas corpus
petitions for Guantanamo detainees held as "enemy combatants." Id. at 2242. The Court viewed the
jurisdiction-stripping provision as an impermissible suspension of the writ of habeas corpus given its
failure to provide adequate substitutes for the writ, and thus the suspension was beyond Congress's
power over federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 2240. Specifically, the 5-4 opinion, authored by Justice
Kennedy (joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter) articulated a separation of
powers functional test. Justice Scalia, dissenting, chided the Court for its unprecedented extension
of habeas corpus rights to "alien enemies" and for its "judicially brainstormed" principles regarding
the functional test for separation of powers. Id. at 2307 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 2277 (emphasis added).
48. Id at 2294-307 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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A judicia l dynamism model wi l l  foster reexamination. Jud icia l
dynamism should occur on both an individual and institutional level.
Dynamism has meaning in  both contexts: (1 ) "vigorous and forceful
quality—a vigorously active, forceful, and energizing quality, especially
as the hallmark o f  somebody's personality o r approach to a task" and
(2) "theory o f  forces—a philosophical or scientific theory stressing the
role of dynamic forces in explaining phenomena, especially by interpret-
ing events as an expression of forces residing within the object or person
involved."
49 Professor Owen Piss calls for a "robust use o f  the judicial power"
always, but especially in times of tenon
s(
' P r o f e s s o r  
F i s s  
m a i n t a i n s  
t h a t  
a
robust judiciary furthers deliberative democracy in a vibrant way through
the Court's interpretation o f  our constitutional values. Acco rd ing  to
Professor Fiss,
robust use of the judicial power—one that projects a clear unquali-
fied view of the requirements of the Constitution—will further, not
diminish, public deliberation and thus democratic values. Such a
use o f  the judicial power does not preclude further action by the
political branches, but rather sets the limits of that action and thus
provides the framework for their continued deliberation.
51Professor Cass Sunstein, an "apostle o f  judicial min ima lism,"
52  r e j e c t sthis position as that of a "liberal perfectionist" who wishes the judiciary
to use broad power to attain the ideal values of progressives. I  do not go
as far as Professor Fiss, but, as discussed supra, I  also reject judicial
minimalism as a strategy for all seasons, especially when used as a po-
litical expedient_
53 
J u d i c i a l  
d y n a m
i s m ,  
u n l
















dictate that the Court always maximize its power. Rather, it  gives the
Court the flexibility to respond as needed, given the circumstances. A
flexibility the Court may need when confronting an ostensibly political
question.
49. ENCARTA W ORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY [NORTH AmER1CAN EDITION] (2009),
http://encarta.msn. comidictionary2Dynamism.html.
50. Owen Piss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 643, 659 (2008)
51. Id
52. Id at 663.
53. Professor Scott Gerber raises an interesting observation on this point. He characterizes the
increased popularity of judicial minimalism as a ' judicial Brezhnev doctrine" in that a subsection of
the liberal academy perceives it may not win, so it wishes to say: "What we have, we keep." Scott
D. Gerber, The Court, the Constitution, and the History of  Ideas, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1067, 1082
(2008).
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Iv. TiE  POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
AS PRIMARILY A PRUDENTIAL CONSTRAINT
The Supreme Court has not clarified whether the political question
doctrine is a constitutional or a prudential restraint.
54 I n  i t s  m o d e r n  
f o r m ,
the political question doctrine is p imarily prudential for two reasons.
First, almost all of the judicially created political question factors have
no constitutional grounding. Second, the motivations for all but one of
the factors inc lude prudential considerations such a s  judic ial
(i) competency, ( ii)  functionality and administration, ( iii)  legitimacy,
(iv) reputation, and (v) comity toward the political branches. Such pru-
dential concerns serve important justifications for jurisdiction-limiting
devices of the federal judiciary. This  Article maintains, however, that
the political question limitation on jurisdiction, as primarily prudential,
should not serve as an insurmountable barrier when the federal judiciary
is needed to address an asymmetric threat to the balance of powers.
The modem political question doctrine does not clearly emanate
from the Constitution. Artic le III sets forth the cases and controversies
over which federal court jurisdiction is proper. T he Article does not
exclude political question matters. Artic le HI does not utter the words
"political question" or allude to such a prohibition. There is no laundry
list o f  excluded matters in general or specific terms. F o r  example,
Article III does not state that the federal judiciary cannot exercise juris-
diction over Senate impeachment trial proceedings of a federal judge.
55Further, the Court has not developed the political question doctrine as an
interpretation of Article III's  confinement of judicial power to "cases"
and "controversies." Nevertheless, even where jurisdictional and other
justiciability requirements are met, the Court has declined to review
particular constitutional challenges to governmental action. The Court
determines that the political branches, legislative and executive, should
resolve these cases. Accordingly, the Court deems these cases nonjusti-
ciable on the basis of the political question doctrine.
The political question doctrine exists as a conventional tool for the
federal judiciary's limitations on jurisdiction. The limiting doctrines of
justiciability include the prohibition on advisory opinions, standing, ripe-
ness, mootness, and political question.
56 M o s t  o f  
t h e s e  
d o c t r i n e s  
a r e  
n o t
absolute conceptually. F or example, ripeness represents the notion of
54. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 45.
55. The Supreme Court, however, found a federal judge's constitutional challenge to Senate
impeachment proceedings a nonjusticiable political question. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224
(1993).
56. MICHAEL P. ALLEN, MICHAEL FINCH &  CAPRICE L.  ROBERTS, FEDERAL COURTS:
CONTEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 32 (forthcoming 2009).
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"not yet," the case is not ready for adjudication; mootness represents the
notion of  "too late," the controversy is no longer justiciable.
57 E v e nstanding, which communicates "not you," implies that the Court would
hear the action if  brought by a proper plaintiff rather than that the Court
will "never" hear the controversy.
58 T h e  
p o l i t i c a l  
q u e s t i o n  
d o c t r i n e
,
however, i f  deemed applicable by the Court, means the Court will never
hear the case.
59 T h e  





n d  
j u r i
s d i
















suant to th  political question doctrine in cases involving the following
areas: foreign affairs,
6° t h e  
i m p e a c h
m e n t  
p r o c e s
s ,
6 1  
t h
e  
r e p u
b l i c




of government clause, and the electoral process.
62 By not hearing constitutional challenges that the Court deems non-
revi wable political questions, is  the Court abdicating its duty? T he
answer depends on whether one views the political question doctrine as
stemming from a constitutional command, prudential considerations, or
both. Although Article III does not exclude political question cases from
federal judicial power, another source for a constitutional constraint is
the separation o f  powers. T h e  structure o f  the Constitution divideS
power in a tripartite fashion between the legislative, executive, and judi-
cial branches, and dictates that one branch not encroach upon another.
Accordingly, if  the matter is textually committed to a branch other than
the judiciary, the Court must stay its hand.
63 E v e n  g r a n t i n g  
t h a t  
c e r t a i n
political question cases re nonreviewable as a separation-of-powers
command, the Court has extended the political question doctrine well
beyond the constitutional prohibition.
The expansion of the doctrine includes largely prudential concerns
regarding judicial functionality and legitimacy. These concerns morph
into judicially created, clunky factors. I t  is difficult to predict their
application, but the purpose is apparently to give the Court an avenue to
57.1d fig.2-1.
58. SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 4, at 107 n.1 ( " [A] standing holding only says 'not you,'
instead of 'never,' leaving the other branches to wonder whether the Court might someday find a
suitable plaintiff if sufficiently tempted to do so.").
59. I f  one adopts a political question doctrine that is flexible to the context, i t would be
possible for the Court to apply the doctrine to a case and mean "not in this instance but perhaps later
i f the times warrant it."
60. See, e.g., Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923) (leaving to the political
branches the issue of when war begins and ends); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
61. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (ruling the Senate's impeachment
trial a nonjusticiable political question based on Article l ' s textual commitment of impeachment to
the Senate).
62. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (holding that the Constitution
committed to Congress the issue of which government is the established one).
63. The federal court considers whether determination of the case is "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." Baker  v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
586 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:569
defer to the political process as a matter o f wise judicial administration
and interbranch comity. T h e  modern political question doctrine, as
enunciated by the Supreme Court, includes additional factors—any one
of which may result in the Court declining review:
• " l a c k  o f judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it";
• " impossib ility o f  deciding without a n  in it ia l p o licy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion";
• " impossib ility of a court's undertaking independent resolu-
tion without expressing lack o f  respect due coordinate
branches of government";
• "unusua l need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made"; and
• "potentia lity o f  embarrassment f ro m multifarious p ro -
nouncements by various departments on one question."'
4In Marbuiy v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall narrowly articulated non-
reviewable polit ical questions as cases centering on  the Executive's
exercise o f  discretion; he explicitly excluded political questions raising
individual constitutional rights.
65 I n  i t s  
m o d e r n  
f o r m ,  
t h e  
p o l i t i c
a l  
q u e s
-
tion doctrine extends far beyond Chief Justice Marshall's vision. Th e
doctrine notably covers cases i n  wh ich  individuals raise concrete
constitutional injury.
In 1993, for example, former federal Judge Walter Nixon raised a
constitutional challenge t o  the  Senate's impeachment proceedings
gainst h im.
6 6  H e  
s o u g
h t  
t o  
c h a
l l e






















tee o f  Senators to hear evidence against an impeached individual and
report to the fu ll Senate. Nixo n  claimed the rule violated the Impeach-
ment Trial Clause, Article I, Section 3, clause six, which authorizes the
Senate to " try"  all impeachments.
° T h e  C o u r t  
f o u n d  
t h e  
c h a l l e n g
e  
t o  
b e
a nonjusticiable p litical question because the issue involved "a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment o f  the issue to  a  coordinate
political department" and "a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
ble standards for resolvi g it . "
6 8  T h u s ,  
h e  
C o u r t  
d e n i e d  
i t s e l f  
t h e  
p o w
e r
to hear t e ca e.
64. Id.
65. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
66. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226.
67. Id. at 228.
68. Id.
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The Court's reasoning, however, is questionable. Viewing these
two political question factors as linked,
69 t h e  C o u r t  
r e a s o n e d  
t h a t  
t h e
Constitution's text—"try" and "sole"—demonstrated the textual com-
mitment of authority to the Senate and the word "try" lacked manageable
standards for judicial resolution.
7c1 T h e  l a t t e r  
i s s u e  
e v i d e n c e
s  
a  
p r u d e n
t i a l
concern. The Court also found further prudential support, "counsel[ing]
against justiciability," based on "the lack of finality and the difficulty of
fashioning reli f."
71 T h e  
o n l y  
a r g u a
b l e  
c o n s t
i t u t i o











review is  the notion that the Constitution's text commits the issue
exclusively to the Senate and that review by the judicial branch therefore
would violate the text and the separation of powers. The Court's consti-
tutional interpretation that the text precludes judicial review, even if  the
Senate has the sole authority to try impeachments, does not show bullet-
proof logic.
Justice White's concurring opinion poses a reasonable, persuasive
interpretation of the constitutional text—Article I does not render "final
responsibility for interpreting the scope and nature" of the impeachment
power to the Senate.
72 
A c c o r d i n g
l y ,  
a l t h o
u g h  
t h
e  
C o n s
t i t u t





the Senate "the power to try impeachments," neither the text nor the
history negates judicial review authority.
73 O n  t h e  
m e r i t s ,  
J u s t i c e  
W i t e


















































not warrant federal judicial action in order to check joint action of the
political branches as discussed below. Accordingly, prudential reasons
such as proper judicial functioning and legitimacy may still have war-
ranted the Court's finding of nonjusticiability. A  finding of justiciability,
coupled with Justice White's recommended substantive ruling, however,
would not have disrespected the Senate or impermissibly encroached into
its sphere of power.
Regardless of  disagreements about the proper application o f  the
political question doctrine in any given case, the doctrine maintains its
resiliency as a limiting device. Scholarly and judicial support for the
political question doctrine stems from a concern about the federal
judiciary's delicate institutional legitimacy!' Federal court legitimacy
69. Id at 228-29.
70. Id. at 228-32,236.
71. ki. at 236.
72. Id. at 240 (White, J., concurring) (Blackmun, J., joining).
73. Id at 243.
74. Id at 250.
75. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note I 5, at 184 (justifying the political question doctrine on, inter
alio, "the inner vulnerability, the self doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and
has no earth to draw strength from"); see also Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. 186,267 (1962) (Frankfurter,
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has evolved far from its fragile roots. Critics of the political question
doctrine discredit this faulty assumption and maintain that any invocation
of the political question doctrine threatens the federal judiciary's duty to
exercise judicial review when it matters most.
76 T h i s  t h r e a t  
i s  a r g u a b l y  
a t
its greatest when individuals claim concrete violations of constitutional
rights based upon political branches exceeding their  authority in
concert.
77 Assuming the Court is not yet convinced or prepared to eliminate
the political question doctrine, it  should lean toward embracing, rather
than avoiding, certain confrontations posed in asymmetric times. This
shift should occur even for  cases evidencing separation-of-powers
tensions. I n  fact, the possibility of interbranch conflict may make judi-
cial review all the more imperative. T he following Part articulates a
standard by which the Court may determine when judicial review matters
most, when the Court should review even a political question.
V. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL NONABDICATION IN ASYMMETRICAL TIMES
In asymmetrical times, the Court should pay particularly close
attention when the Executive exerts increased power and Congress
acquiesces. Specifically, when the other two branches of government are
in agreement, there may be a heightened need for judicial review to
protect constitutional rights and ensure proper checks and balances. This
more watchful eye would not focus, however, on every occasion when
the President signs a federal bill into law. Instead, the need for the judi-
ciary's higher vigilance arises when the political branches jointly exert
power in the name of exigency borne of crisis.
Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues" conception empowers the
Supreme Court.
78 I t  
e m p o w




u r t  
n
















Court to avoid jurisdiction and decline review in the name of prudence.
Its underlying principles—discretion and prudence -support the pruden-
tial, rather than constitutional, conclusion o f  the political question
doctrine. Further, the underlying principles condone avoidance, espe-
J., dissenting) (advocating self-preservation of the Court's shaky legitimacy by avoiding the issue of
constitutionality of malapportionment).
76. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 99-105 (1987), Martin
H. Redish, Judicial Review and the Political Question, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031,1033,1045-46
(1984); see also Linda Sandstrom Sinard, Standing Alone.
- D o  W e  S t i l l  
N e e d  t h e  
P o l i t i c a l  
Q u e s t i o n
Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303 (1996); Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability Myth and the
Concept of Law, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 595 (1987).
77. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006).
78. Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term: Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HA8v. L. REV. 40 (1961).
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cially i f  separation-of-powers tensions are fierce. I  posit that, fo r a
certain class o f  fierce cases, the Court should lean toward reviewing the
case.
Regarding th e  Supreme Court 's ro le ,  Justice Brandeis once
commented, "The most important thing we do is not do ing ."
79  J u s t i c eBreyer echoed this principle to no avail in  his impassioned dissent in
Bush v. Gore when he urged that it was a mistake to take the case.
° T h evalidity o f this bold endorsement of restraint may often be in the eye o f
the beholder—depending on one's satisfaction with  the outcome in  a
given case. N o  doubt there are times when it  is critical that the Court
stay its hand, but at other grave times it may be critical that the Court act
rather than abstain. The difficult issue is when.
Certain components o f  the Constitution are purposefully broad to
allow the flexibility necessary for an evolving democracy. The  parame-
ters o f  the separation-of-powers boundaries, f o r  example, a re  n o t
explicitly described in the Constitution. A s  Justice Jackson suggested in
his concurrence i n  Youngstown,
81  f o r m a l i s m  
a n d  
c a t e g o r i c a
l
imperatives tend  n o t  t o  serve consciously inserted constitutional
mbiguities in the separation-of-powers structure. He  aptly reasoned,
As to whether there is imperative necessity for such powers, it  is
relevant to note the gap that exists between the President's paper
powers and his real powers. The Constitution does not disclose the
measure o f the actual controls wielded by the modem presidential
office. That instrument must be understood as an Eighteenth-
Century sketch of a government hoped for, not as a blueprint of the
Government that is. Vast accretions of federal power, eroded from
that reserved by the States, have magnified the scope of presidential
activity. Subtle shifts take place in the centers of real power that do
not show on the face of the Constitution.
82Accordingly, the proper sphere o f  each branch is not fixed in  Justice
Jackson's conception; rather, each branch must retain flexibility to adapt
to the posture taken by the other branches.
83 Justice Jackson's sentiments apply to the ongoing global war on
terror. A lthough  he maintained that the Executive power is greatest
when the action receives express congressional approval and lowest
79. BICKEL, supra note 15, at 71.
80. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 144, 158 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 654.
83. Id;  see also Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of  Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1934 (2007) ("Under Jackson's conception of the separation of powers, the
roles of the three branches of government are not rigidly defined, but rather are flexible, shifting to
accommodate the positions taken by the others.").
590 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:569
when the action is in contravention of legislative proscription,
84 h e  a l s ounderstood that meaningful congressional oversight might not ex is t.
85Specifically, Justice Jackson recognized that the President's powers
include the ability of persuasion over those designed to serve as checks
on executive power: "By his prestige as head of state and his influence
upon public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those who are supposed to
check and balance his power which often cancels their effectiveness."
86 Times of crisis stimulate expedited, significant political action. The
intensity of the crisis may dilute the ability of one political branch to
check the other. For example, Professor Amanda Frost examines former
President George W. Bush's repeated utilization o f  the state secrets
privilege as a means for dismissal of civil cases challenging the constitu-
tionality o f  executive action," and she recommends that where
"Congress is  unable or  unwilling to take on [oversight], then the
judiciary's role in checking executive power is paramount."
88 N o t a b l y ,she further dvises, "[c]ourts should be particularly hesitant to forgo
jurisdiction when the executive is seeking an across-the-board dismissal
of all cases challenging particular executive branch programs, because
such claims implicate Congress's constitutional authority, as well as the
courts'."
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tion of state secrets privilege, her focal point shows a prime example of
possible congressional acquiescence in  executive action that should
warrant a heightened judicial responsibility to review the action. I  argue
that acquiescence occurs when "Congress appears unwilling or unable to
inquire into the legality of executive conduct."" The lack of political
oversight in conjunction with the gravity and sweep of the Executive's
stance (i.e., dismissal of all cases) warrants judicial oversight. I n  such
circumstances, the Court should reserve the possibility of judicial review,
even when, ordinarily, a doctrine of restraint might dictate otherwise.
To clarify when the Court should lea'n in favor of review, it may
help to consider a recent Supreme Court case that arguably fits, but upon
closer analysis does not pose the threat I envision. F or  example, the
Court may have subconsciously followed an oversight motivation in
84. Youngsiown, 343 U.S. at 637; see also Frost, supra note 83.
85. Youngsiown, 343 U.S. at 654-55.
86. Id. Notably, Justice Jackson further stated, "I cannot be brought to believe that this country
will suffer i f  the Court refuses further to aggrandize the presidential office, already so potent and so
relatively immune from judicial review, at the expense of Congress." Id. at 655 (footnote omitted).
87. Frost, supra note 83, at 1931.
88.M at 1934.
89. id. at 1958.
90. Id. at 1962.
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Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,
91 b u t  t h e  
u n d e r l y i n g
facts of this s anding case involved the political branches' coalescing in
their non-action.
The Court, in a 5-4 decision by Justice Stevens, ruled the case justi-
ciable and controversially found that the state of Massachusetts estab-
lished standing; the Court reasoned that the procedural right in the Envi-
ronmental Protection Ac t ,  coupled w i t h  the  state's "stake i n
protecting its quasi-sovereign interests," warranted "special solicitude in
the [Court's] standing analysis."
92 T h u s  f r e e  
t o  
r e a c h  
t h e  
m e r i t s
,  
t h e
Court ruled that the Equal Protection Agency acted arbitrarily in its
refusal to determine whether greenhouse gases contribute to climate
change.
93 In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts asserted that the majority creates a
"new theory" that "dilutes" the Article III standing requirement to a van-
ishing point.
94 
F u r t h
e r ,  
R o b
e r t s  
o p
i n






















may have been "more symbolic than anything else" and, accordingly, the
Co rt's grant o f  jurisdiction violated the Court's proper role by
"serv[ing] as a convenient forum for policy debates."
95 I s  t h i s  c a s e  
a n
example of a power grab by the Court, acting in the face of non-action
nd in a time of environmental crisis? That is a question for another day.
This case may raise an unusual example of the political branches acting
in concert to use power to not act. The Court must be careful to maintain
Article ill's  standing requirements despite the exigencies. Regardless of
any possible critiques of the Court's standing analysis, Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency does not pose an instance in which the
Executive and Congress affirmatively acted in concert to deprive con-
crete constitutional rights of individuals. Further, this case does not pose
the threat of the political branches seeking to insulate themselves from
judicial oversight, as did the States Secrets Cases
96 o r  t h e  m i l i t a r ydetainee cases.
In order to appreciate when the judiciary should lean toward
review, consider how interbranch alignment might affect the political
question analysis as described in  the fo llowing two  scenarios. I n
scenario one, litigation challenges federal government action in which
Congress and the President have acted in concert in a manner that impli-
91. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
92. Id at 520.
93. M at 534.
94. Id at 540-41 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id at 547.
96. Frost, supra note 83, at 1963 (proposing that the judiciary stay the State Secret cases and
try to delegate oversight back to Congress and thus prevent the ability of "the executive to evade the
oversight our tripartite system of government generally requires").
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cates grave constitutional values. I n  scenario two, litigation challenges
federal conduct implicating grave constitutional values, but Congress and
the President take opposing positions. Jus tic iability  doctrines o f
restraint, such as political question, should adapt differently to these sce-
narios. The prudential calculus could reasonably be expected to be sensi-
tive to the distinct concerns raised.
In scenario one, the political risk for the Court is higher because
both political branches are moving in  one direction. B u t  in  that
circumstance, the Court may be the only institutional actor that is in a
position to uphold the limited powers enumerated in the Constitution.
An example of such concert action arose with the detainee legislation in
which "Congress became a full partner of the President in this front of
the 'War on Terror.'"
97 T h e  
b o l d  
p o w e r  
a s s e r t






c u t i
v e
Branch combined with the acquiescence of Congress dictated that the
Court not avoid the conflict. I n  Hamdan,
98 t h e  C o u r t  
f o u n d  
t h a t  
t h e
military commissi ns instituted by President Bush violated federal law
and the Geneva Conventions.
99 A l t h o u g h  
h e  
C o u r t  
r e a c h e
d  
t h e  
m e r i t
s ,  
i t
avoided a t orny interbranch conflict with Congress by interpreting the
Detainee Treatment Act's jurisdiction-stripping provision as not applica-
ble to Hamdan's pending case.
m T h e  
H a m d a n  
C o u r t  
i n s t e a
d  
c h o s
e  
t o
signal to Congress: if  you intend to strip jurisdiction and suspend the writ
of h beas corpus, be c lear .
lcu I n  
J u s t i c e  
S c a l i a ' s  
d i s s e n
t ,  
j o i n
e d  
b
y
Justices Thomas and Alito, he reasoned that the majority opinion's
finding o f  jurisdiction was "patently erroneous" because the plain
language of the Act as well as Court precedent established that the Act
applied to all pending cases, including the instant Hamdan case, before
the Cour t .
m2 
T h e  
m a j o
r i t y






















Court would rather not unnecessarily confront Congress regarding
Congr ss's control over federal court jurisdiction.
97. Fiss, supra note 50, at 647.
98. Hamdan v. Rmnsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). O f  the eight participating Justices, a five-
justice majority concluded that the military commissions established by President Bush's administra-
tion to try suspected al Qaeda terrorist members were not authorized by federal law, not required by
military necessity, and violative of the Geneva Conventions.
99. Id
100. Id at 584 & n.15. After  extensive statutory construction of the Act regarding whether its
jurisdiction-stripping provision had immediate effect upon all pending cases, the Court found juris-
diction proper because the Act, despite its effective datc on the date of enactment, was silent on
whether the jurisdiction-stripping provision applied to pending cases in contrast to other provisions
expressly applicable to pending matters. Id. at 576-84.
101. Id at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting "the limited nature of the Court's decision" and
stressing "that the Court had done no more than declare that Congress had failed to grant the
President the authority to create the kind of commission .  Nothing prevents the President from
returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes is necessary.").
102. Id at 655 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The majority's signaling, however, resulted when Congress passed
the Military Commissions Act to clarify its purposes. I n  Boumediene,
the Court finally found an unconstitutional suspension of the writ, but at
what constitutional costs in the inter im?
I03 T h e  C o u r t ' s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
was essential to correcting the course of the political branches. Justice
Ke nedy viewed that the separation-of-powers doctrine was strengthened
through the Court's review of the Executive's authority to imprison a
person, and, thus, "the exercise of those [executive] powers is vindicated,
not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch."
th4 T h e  C o u r tdeclared t at it was unwilling "[t]o hold the political branches have the
power to switch the Constitution on or off' because "the writ of habeas
corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separa-
tion of powers."
m T h e  
i s s u e  
i s  
w h e t


















ore clearly and more quickly.
In scenario two, the need for Court safeguarding is less present. I f
the Court accepts jurisdiction, it  will have political cover to the extent
that at least one of the political branches will likely be in accord with the
Court's ruling. The need, however, for the Court to accept jurisdiction as
a constitutional safeguard is  lessened because both Congress and
the President will have tools at their disposal for self-help. Such tools
include Congress's spending power, the President's veto, and Congress's
override. I n  the conflict scenario, there could be a great need for the
Court to step in, but only if  the entire system is on the brink of constitu-
ional crisis.
Finally, another special category includes instances in which the
two other branches conspire to deprive the Court of its core functions:
jurisdiction-stripping cases. In  that instance, the Court must preserve its
constitutional role as a defensive measure so that it  has the capacity
to fulfi ll its function. With that said, Congress does, under Article III,
103. Fiss, supra note 50, at 657 ("We can now readily see the costs of such a minimalist
strategy: the cycles of litigation, the hardship on the prisoners, and the resources consumed by the
judicial and legislative branches. But what has been gained?").
104. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008). Interestingly, according to Justice
Kennedy, i f history does not answer the question, there were other powerful reasons, including the
separation of powers, that warranted the Court finding the suspension of the writ unconstitutional in
Boumediene. B y  contrast, Justice Kennedy joins the majority opinion in Heller, in which Justice
Scalia maintains that the necessary path for  interpretation of  the Second Amendment is original
public meaning. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (ruling that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to own a gun for  private, not just militia, use). Justice
Kennedy viewed the Boumediene case in its context of terrorism and strained interbranch tension,
which may have led him to act dynamically, rather than rigidly, to resolve that a functional separa-
tion of powers would best address the questions raised. The Heller case, however, raised a distinct
constitutional question not unique to asymmetric times.
105. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
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possess vast power to alter the jurisdiction o f  the federal courts. I t
cannot, however, use that power to extinguish the judicial function by
stripping jurisdiction or effectively curtailing the necessary tools for ju-
dicial review. The Constitution calls for the Court to be the judge in its
own case in that circumstance. I f  the political branches act in concert to
eviscerate the Court's essential functions, the Court has a duty to




In times o f  asymmetrical warfare, when separation-of-powers
tensions intensify, the Court must act to preserve its essential functions.
The Court should not blindly march to the tune of judicial minimalism;
rather, i t  needs a  broader, more flexible theory such as judic ial
dynamism. Such a doctrine enables the Court to engage honestly and to
embrace confrontation when necessary. In  particular, judicial dynamism
permits the Court to reexamine prudential doctrines of restraint such as
political questions. When individuals raise concrete infringements of
constitutional rights, the Court should analyze the alignment of the other
two branches in order to inform the Court regarding which is  more
prudent—exercising or avoiding review. I n  particular, the Court's duty
to serve as a check may be heightened when Congress and the President
act in concert to exert power based on exigencies and impinge on
individual rights. Although the existence o f  separation o f  powers
tensions places the Court in a precarious position, speaking clearly, and
perhaps more than incrementally, to protect the Constitution should be
the preferred, if  not required, course.
106. The Court in Boumediene should have more directly addressed the MCA's jurisdiction-
stripping provision.
